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In this study, the Lussier (1995) success and failure prediction model is improved and tested on a 
sample of Dutch firms. Besides clearly defining a specific business plan, work experience is added as 
a variable, and contrary to previous researches, the discrete variables are dealt with appropriate this 
time. The results of this improved model show that product/service timing, planning, management 
experience, knowledge of marketing, economic timing, professional advice, and having a business 
partner are predictors of success and failure for young firms in the Netherlands.
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Assessing the Non-Financial Predictors of the 
Success and Failure of Young Firms in the 
Netherlands
After two years, an average of 20 percent of the 
firms established in the Netherlands cease to 
exist. After five years, this figure is 40 percent 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2003). These 
figures   indicate   that   the   first   few   years   of 
existence   are   crucial   for   a   company.   If   a 
company survives the first five years, there is a 
high chance of a great future. Of course after 
five years there are still the remaining 60 percent 
of firms that will one day cease to exist, but here 
one should take into account the fact that these 
60 percent also includes those firms that are 
discontinued after ten, twenty or thirty years due 
to mergers, acquisitions or because there is no 
one to take over or continue the family business. 
But why is it important that young firms survive 
and   become   successful?   “The   view   on 
entrepreneurship developed towards a common 
agreement with respect to its importance for 
(economic) society” (Bosma, Van Praag and De 
Wit, 2000, p.9). Successful young companies 
create a large number of jobs; after start up, a 
new firm creates half a job on average and one-
and-a-half jobs after one year (Houben, 1998). 
Moreover,   the   survival   of   companies   is 
important as the failure of a new entrepreneur 
would   have   negative   implications   in   Dutch 
society   (Schutjens   and   Wever,   2000).   In 
addition,   bankruptcies   often   involve   huge 
personal   dramas;   families   being   torn   apart, 
divorces, and lots of stress due to the financial 
problems. Therefore, prospective entrepreneurs 
would ideally be able to predict the chances of 
success for their proposed business. A success 
versus failure prediction model can help the 
prospective   entrepreneurs   to   determine   the 
probability of success for the proposed business 
more accurately. Other parties that might benefit 
from   such   a   prediction   model   are   existing 
entrepreneurs,   suppliers,   venture   capitalists, 
advisors,   or   public   policy   makers   (Lussier, 
1995).
This article addresses the successes and failures 
of   young   firms.   The   problem   statement 
researched in this paper is: What are the non-
financial predictors of the success and failure of 
young firms in the Netherlands?
The   term   non-financial   predictors   implies 
quantitative and qualitative managerial factors. 
This means that no financial ratios are used as 
predictors. A firm is defined as a success if it is 
still in existence and has made profits in at least 
one year since its establishment. A successful 
firm is required to have made a profit in at least 
one year to make a clear distinction between the 
group of failed firms and the successful ones. 
The definition of failure has caused much debate 
(Watson and Everett, 1996). Discontinuance of a 
business is often used (Baldwin and Gorecki, 
1991; Watson, 2003; and Williams, 1993), but 
for this research a failed firm is defined as a firm 
that   has   gone   bankrupt   or   a   firm   that   has 
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requested a postponement of payments. This 
definition is in line with the definition of failure 
used   by   Lussier   (1995),   Dun   &   Bradstreet 
(2003), and Massel (1978). In order to make a 
clear distinction between the successes and the 
failures only these extreme cases are assessed. 
Obviously, there are also a lot of young firms 
still in existence, but these cannot be called clear 
successes if they have not as yet made any 
profits. Then there are also those entrepreneurs 
that discontinue their business for other reasons 
than bankruptcy or problems with paying the 
creditors. These entrepreneurs are also excluded 
from this research, as they are not real failures. 
A young firm is defined as one in existence for 
less than five years so far. This research is 
limited to the Netherlands.
Model Selection
With regards to the chances of success and 
failure   of   young   firms,   numerous   prediction 
models exist in academic literature. There are 
three criteria, which the selected model has to 
fulfil. Firstly, the aim of this research is to 
predict successes and failures of young firms; 
hence the model has to explain both success and 
failure.   Secondly,   there   has   to   be   a   clear 
distinction   between   successful   and   failed 
businesses, implying that failed businesses are 
businesses that went bankrupt or requested a 
postponement   of   payments   and   are   not 
businesses   that   ceased   to   operate   for   other 
reasons. Successful firms have to be identified 
as clearly successful and not just surviving. 
Thirdly, the variables selected should be non-
financial predictors. This means that no financial 
ratios are tested, but quantitative and qualitative 
managerial   factors.   A   number   of   models, 
including   Bosma,   Van   Praag,   and   De   Wit 
(2000); Bruins, Op de Coul, Stigter, and Van 
Uxem (2000); Cooper, Dunkelberg, Woo, and 
Dennis   (1990);   Cooper,   Gascon,   and   Woo 
(1991); Flerackers (1998); Lussier (1995, 1996a, 
1996b); Lussier and Corman (1996); Lussier and 
Pfeiffer   (2000);   Reynolds   and   Miller   (1987, 
1989); and Schutjens and Wever (2000) were 
investigated to see which model would best fit 
the purpose of this study. The model by Lussier 
(1995) met the criteria that were set the best, and 
was selected as the basic model for answering 
the problem statement.
The Lussier (1995) Model
The Lussier (1995) model is designed to test 
non-financial   predictors   of   the   success   and 
failure of young firms. The fifteen variables of 
the   model   are   capital,   record   keeping   and 
financial   control,   industry   experience, 
management experience, planning, professional 
advisors,   education,   staffing,   product/service 
timing, economic timing, age of owner, partners, 
parents   having   owned   a   business,   being   a 
minority and marketing skills. All variables are 
supported by a large number of articles from 
academic journals. In the original research the 
variables   professional   advice,   planning, 
education   and   staffing   were   found   to   be 
significant. The Lussier (1995) model was used 
to   predict   success   and   failure   in   different 
countries,   for   different   industries   and   for 
companies of different size.
Our Adjustments to the Lussier (1995) Model
Three adjustments have been made to the Lussier 
(1995) model. The first adjustment was to add the 
variables   marketing   plan,   production   plan, 
personnel plan, financial plan and R&D plan to 
the   model.   This   adjustment   was   made   to 
overcome the limitation of not clearly defining 
what is meant by a specific business plan. A 
specific business plan consists of five sub plans: 
the   marketing   plan,   the   financial   plan,   the 
personnel plan, the production plan and the R&D 
plan (Houben, 2000). See table 1 for a short 
description of each sub-plan. 
Table 1
Specific business plan
Marketing plan Products and services, market, competition and sales 
Production plan Production process, capacity, degree of capacity utilisation and controlling stocks
Personnel plan Hiring and selection process, composition of board and remuneration
Financial plan Translating all sub-plans into financial facts
R&D plan Developing new products and services and improving existing ones
Source: Houben (2000).
The second adjustment is the addition of the 
variable of work experience. Work experience 
was added to the model because it showed itself 
to be a contributing factor to success and failure 
in   pieces   of   research,   Bosma   et   al.   (2000); 
Flerackers   (1998);   and   Schutjens   and   Wever 
(2000), carried out in the Netherlands. Research 
by   Kennedy   (1985)   also   showed   it   to   be   a 
contributing factor. The third adjustment relates 
to the fact that the Lussier (1995) research did not 
recode discrete variables into dummy variables; 
this research will address the discrete variables 
appropriately. The original Lussier (1995) model 
and adjustments to this model resulted in the 
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design of 23 hypotheses. Of these, 21 hypotheses 
refer to the testing of each individual variable, 1 
hypothesis tests the Lussier (1995) model and 1 
the adjusted Lussier (1995) model. All variables 
are presented and explained in table 2. Table 3 
presents   an   overview   of   the   sources   of   the 
different variables.
Table 2
Success versus Failure variables
Capital (capt). Businesses that start undercapitalized have a greater chance of failure than firms that start with 
adequate capital.
Record keeping and financial control (rkfc). Businesses that do not keep updated and accurate records and do 
not use adequate financial controls have a greater chance of failure than firms that do.
Industry experience (inex). Businesses managed by people without prior industry experience have a greater 
chance of failure than firms managed by people with prior industry experience.
Work experience (woex). Businesses managed by people without prior work experience have a greater chance 
of failure than firms managed by people with prior work experience.
Management experience (maex). Businesses managed by people without prior management experience have a 
greater chance of failure than firms managed by people with prior management experience.
Marketing plan (mapl). Businesses that do not develop a marketing plan have a greater chance of failure than 
firms that do.
Financial plan (fipl). Businesses that do not develop a financial plan have a greater chance of failure than firms 
that do.
Personnel plan (pepl). Businesses that do not develop a personnel plan have a greater chance of failure than 
firms that do.
Production plan (prpl). Businesses that do not develop a production plan have a greater chance of failure than 
firms that do.
R&D plan (rdpl). Businesses that do not develop an R&D plan have a greater chance of failure than firms that 
do.
Planning (plan). Businesses that do not develop specific business plans have a greater chance of failure than 
firms that do.
Professional advisors (prad). Businesses that do not use professional advisors have a greater chance of failure 
than firms using professional advisors. 
Education (educ). People without any college education who start a business have a greater chance of failure 
than people with one or more years of college education.
Staffing (staf). Businesses that cannot attract and retain quality employees have a greater chance of failure than 
firms that can.
Product/service timing (psti). Businesses that select products/services that are too new or too old have a greater 
chance of failure than firms that select products/services that are in the growth stage.
Economic timing (ecti). Businesses that start during a recession have a greater chance of failure than firms that 
start during expansion periods.
Age (age). Younger people who start a business have a greater chance of failing than older people starting a 
business.
Partners (part). A business started by one person has a greater chance of failure than a firm started by more 
than one person.
Parents (pent). Business owners whose parents did not own a business have a greater chance of failure than 
owners whose parents had a business.
Minority (mior). Minorities have a greater chance of failure than nonminorities.
Marketing (mark). Businesses owners without marketing skills have a greater chance of failure than owners 
with marketing skills.
Source: Lussier (1995), Bakker (2004).
Table 3




capt Rkfc inex maex plan prad educ staf psti ecti age part pent mior mark woex
Bruno, Leidecker and Harder 
(1987)
C C - C C - - C C C - - - - C -
Cooper, Gascon and Woo (1991) C - C N - C C - N N N N C C - -
Gaskill, Van Auken and Manning 
(1993)
N C C C C C N - - N - - - - C -
Kennedy (1985) C - - C C - - - - C - - - - - C
Lussier (1995) N N N C C C C N N N N N N N N -
Lussier (1996a) N C N C C C C C N C N C C N C -
Lussier (1996b) N C N N C C N N C C C N N N N -
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Lussier and Corman (1996) C C C N C C C C N C N N C C N -
Reynolds (1987) C C - - C - - N C - - - - - - -
Sommers and Koc (1987) - - - C C - - C - - - - - - - -
Flerackers (1998) C - - - C - C - - - C - - C - C
Schutjens and Wever (2000) - - - - C - - - - - - C - - - C
Bosma, Van Praag and De Wit 
(2000)
- - C - - - - - - - C - - - - C
Bruins, Op de Coul and Van 
Uxem (2000)
C - C N - - N - - - C - - - - N
Number of C in 14 previous 
studies 
a
10 7 8 10 6 7 5 3 4 3 1 3 0 1 3 U
Number of N in 14 previous 
studies
1 0 1 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 U
Number of - in 14 previous studies  3 7 5 2 6 7 7 10 10 10 11 11 14 13 11 U
Total C 17 13 13 16 17 13 10 7 7 8 5 5 3 4 6 4
Total N 5 1 4 6 2 0 5 4 4 4 6 4 2 3 3 1
Total - 6 14 11 6 9 15 13 17 17 16 17 19 23 21 19 9
a The 14 previous studies are a summary of results presented in the research by Lussier and Pfeifer (2001). 
C supports variable as a contributing factor 
N does not supports variable as a contributing factor 
- does not mention variable as a contributing factor
U unknown, because only the summaries of the results for the fifteen Lussier (1995) variables were obtained from 
the study by Lussier and Pfeifer (2001).
The new planning variables have not been entered in the table, because none of the articles made the distinction into 
sub-plans for planning
Source: Lussier and Pfeifer (2001), Bakker (2004).
Research methodology
The research design that was chosen for this 
research was a causal research design. To obtain 
the primary research data, the respondents were 
first contacted by telephone and asked for their 
cooperation.   If  they  agreed   to   participate,   a 
questionnaire was sent to them by post or by e-
mail.   The   types   of   questions   asked   on   the 
questionnaire   had   different   forms:   open   and 
closed,   dichotomous,   multiple   choice,   Likert 
summated   rating   and   Semantic   differential 
scales   (Brassington   and   Pettitt,   2000).   The 
questionnaire design is based on the one used by 
Lussier (1995). Changes have been made to 
overcome differences regarding language and 
educational system. Several extra demographic 
questions   were   also   asked   to   allow   good 
matching. The sampling process designed by 
Aaker et al. (1998) was used to obtain the 
sample. The sample can be split up into two 
groups: successful and failed firms. A random 
sample of successful (starters, younger than five 
years and still in operation) and failed firms 
(starters, younger than five years and bankrupt 
or in postponement of payments) was drawn 
from the trade register of the Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce. Reliability and validity are assessed 
through previous research, Lussier (1995, 1996a, 
1996b), and pre-testing the questionnaire. The 
failed firms were matched with successful ones 
on the basis of size (number of employees and 
turnover), age (all firms were 5 year old or 
younger),   industry   classification,   debt-equity 
ratio at start-up, and also their area of operation 
(provinces and countries). 
The model (see table 4) was tested in SPSS 
using logistic regression. Discrete variables have 
to be transformed into dummy variables before 
they can enter the regression (Tabachnick and 
Fidell,   1996).   The   response   rate   for   the 
successful and failed firms was 41% and 21% 
respectively. The overall response rate was 31% 
(Wiseman and Billington, 1984).
Table 4
The Model
Success/Failure =  f(capital (-), record keeping and financial control (+), industry experience (+), working 
experience (+), management experience (+), marketing planning (-), financial planning (-), personnel planning 
(-), production planning (-), R&D planning (-), planning (-), professional advisors (-), education (+), staffing (+), 
product/service timing (+), economic timing (+), age of owner (+), partners (+), parents having owned a business 
(+), minority (-), marketing skills (+)). 
Plusses and minuses indicate the expected signs.
Source: Bakker (2004)
Logistic   regression   can   predict   success   and 
failure from variables that may be continuous, 
discrete, dichotomous, or a mix of any of these. 
However,   before   the   analysis,   the   discrete 
variables have to be recoded into dichotomous 
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or dummy  variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1996). This was not done in the research by 
Lussier (1995) or Lussier and Pfeifer (2001) in 
the United States and Croatia, respectively. The 
variables capital, record keeping and financial 
control,   marketing   plan,   financial   plan, 
personnel   plan,   production   plan,   R&D   plan, 
planning, professional advice, staffing, product 
service timing, economic timing, and marketing 
are all discrete variables. A dummy is created 
for all discrete variables. 
Results 
The numbers of completed questionnaires that 
was ultimately used for this research was 84: 42 
for the successful and 42 for the failed firms. 
Even   though   successful   firms  were   matched 
with   failed   firms   some   small   differences 
between the two sample groups were observed. 
There were more females owners among the 
successful firms than among the failed firms. 
The failed firms are represented slightly better in 
the higher turnover classes than the successful 
firms. The successful firms started their firm 
with more equity than debt compared to the 
failed firms. Failed firms had more employees 
than   successful   firms.   Successful   and   failed 
firms   operate   more   or   less   in   the   same 
geographical areas. Successful and failed firms 
were perfectly matched in terms of industry 
class.
There were 61 significant correlations observed 
(see table 7, appendix). A large number of these 
significant correlations were found among the 
variables that deal with the planning of a firm. 
The variance inflation factor showed relatively 
high values for the variables financial planning 
and planning. For nine of the 21 variables, the 
difference in means was found to be significant: 
industry   experience,   work   experience, 
management   experience,   the   marketing, 
financial and personnel plans, planning, staffing, 
age and partner. 
The test of the goodness of fit of the model is a 
test for measuring the overall significance of the 
model. Comparing the constant-only model with 
the full model produced a chi-square of 42.698 
with a significance of .003. Comparing the full 
model with the perfect model produced a –2 LL 
statistic of 73.751. The Hosmer & Lemeshow 
test, for formally evaluating the goodness of fit, 
yielded   2.364   with   a   significance   of   .968. 
Besides   looking   at   the   goodness   of   fit,   the 
model’s performance can also be assessed by 
looking   at   how   well   the   model   accurately 
predicts the data. The model overall correctly 
classified   81   percent   of   the   successes   and 
failures. Seven of the 21 variables that were 
tested were found to be significant predictors of 
success   and   failure   for   young   Dutch   firms. 
These   variables   are   product/service   timing, 
planning,   management   experience   and 
marketing   (p<.05);   economic   timing, 
professional advice and partner (p<.10). 
The original Lussier (1995) model was also used 
to test the data.  The model chi-square is 34.503, 
the addition of the six variables or change in –2 
LL  has  a   significance   of   .224.  The   –2  LL 
statistic is 81.945; the Hosmer & Lemeshow 
statistic is 12.449 with a significance of .132. 
The   overall   classification   accuracy   of   the 
original model is 81 percent. The significant 
variables   (p<.10)   are   planning,   management 
experience,   marketing   and   product/service 
timing.
Table 5
Logistic Regression Model Test Results
Test for the Goodness of Fit of the Model
(comparable to the overall F test for regression)
-2 Log Likelihood 73.751 Significance
Hosmer & Lemeshow  2.364 .968
Model Chi-square 42.698 .003
Improvement 42.698 .003
Classification Accuracy of the Model
Predicted Group Percentage
Correct
Actual Group Failure Success
Failure 81% 19% 81%
(34) (8)
Success 19% 81% 81%
(8) (34)
Overall Correctly Classified 81%
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Parameter Estimates and Significant Variables
Variable Name Beta Wald Significance
Capital .948 1.072 .300
Record Keeping and Financial Control 1.503 2.514 .113
Industry Experience .024 .182 .670
Working Experience -.167 2.476 .116
Management Experience -.187 4.693 .030**
Marketing Plan -1.713 2.471 .116
Financial Plan -1.020 1.048 .306
Personnel Plan .926 1.320 .251
Production Plan .711 .741 .389
R & D Plan .122 .020 .886
Planning 2.754 5.330 .021**
Professional Advice -1.495 3.115 .078*
Years of Education .057 .229 .633
Staffing 1.300 2.205 .138
Product Service Timing 2.052 5.716 .017**
Economic Timing -1.520 3.675 .055*
Age -.057 1.164 .281
Partner -1.151 2.886 .089*
Parents -.809 1.071 .301
Minority .847 .248 .619
Marketing 1.771 4.015 .045**
Constant 1.791 .583 .445
* p<.10 ** p<.05  
Source: Bakker (2004).
Discussion 
In   this   research   matching   was   done   more 
accurately than in the research by Lussier (1995) 
and   by   Lussier   and   Pfeifer   (2001).   Besides 
industry, age and the number of employees, the 
firms in this research have also been matched on 
the basis of turnover and debt-equity ratio at 
start-up to ensure a more relevant comparison. 
The high correlations and multicollinearity are 
not a reason for concern, because they do not 
severely damage the model, which was observed 
when testing an adjusted model.
The difference in means for the 21 variables was 
assessed.   Testing   the   significance   of   the 
difference in means can be seen as a comparison 
of  the  resources  available  to  successful  and 
failed   firms   (Lussier,   1995).   The   successful 
firms   had   fewer   difficulties   in   finding   and 
retaining   qualified   personnel   than   the   failed 
firms, as was expected. Contrary to expectations, 
owners of failed firms had more industry, work, 
management and life experience (age). Similar 
results regarding these variables were found by 
Bruins   et   al.   (2000),   Cooper   et   al.   (1991), 
Flerackers   (1998),   and   Reynolds   and   Miller 
(1989). A possible explanation for these results 
is that one needs a young, fresh and flexible 
mentality   in   order   to   be   a   successful 
entrepreneur, and not a mentality that has been 
“fixed” too much by all the years of experience. 
Moreover, failed firms prepared more detailed 
financial,   personnel   and   overall   plans   than 
successful firms. This can be explained by the 
fact that “out-of-the-box-thinking” is required in 
order to successfully run a business. A surplus of 
rules described in predefined plans can be a kind 
of a straightjacket in which this concept cannot 
be put into practice, because the company is too 
focused   on   following   the   pre-defined   plans. 
Houben (2000) and Braunschweig (2003) as 
well mention the risk of exaggerating planning. 
Also contrary to expectations, it appears that 
having a business partner does not increase the 
chances   of   success.   This   can   be   explained 
because one cannot have two captains on a ship; 
this   will   ultimately   go   wrong   and   cause 
problems. Cooper et al. (1991) found as well 
that having a partner is not a predictor for 
survival. 
Assessing the goodness of fit of the model, the 
adjusted Lussier (1995) model proofs to be a 
good model. The model correctly predicts 81 
percent of the successes and failures in the 
sample, which is equally accurate as the Lussier 
(1995)   model.   Regarding   the   classification 
accuracy of the model, this research outperforms 
previous researches in the U.S. and Croatia. 
Possible   explanations   for   this   are   the   more 
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accurate   matching   and   the   use   of   dummy 
variables in the logistic regression. 
Product/service timing, planning, management 
experience and marketing are significant (p<.05) 
predictors of success and failure for young firms 
in   the   Netherlands.   Economic   timing, 
professional   advice   and   partner   are   also 
significant   (p<.10)   predictors.   The   signs   for 
planning, management experience and partner 
were exactly the opposite of what was expected. 
Possible explanations are that too much planning 
restricts a firm in its ability to quickly respond to 
changes in the market, ultimately leading to firm 
failure.   Houben   (2003)   and   Braunschweig 
(2003) address this issue as well. Too many 
years of management experience can mean that a 
manager no longer has an open mind regarding 
to new issues, also ultimately leading to firm 
failure.   Bruins   et   al.   (2000)   and   Flerackers 
(1998) provided similar results and explanations. 
Finally, the sign for partner can be explained by 
the fact that two persons being in charge of the 
same thing will cause problems. Cooper et al. 
(1991) also found this.
Conclusion
This   paper   investigated   the   non-financial 
predictors of the success and failure for young 
Dutch firms. The Lussier (1995) model was 
selected as the basic model for answering the 
problem statement. Adjustments to the Lussier 
(1995) model were made regarding planning, 
work experience and the treatment of discrete 
variables. This research transformed the discrete 
variables into dummy variables to enable a good 
logistic regression analysis. All the adjustments 
resulted in a new model: the adjusted Lussier 
(1995) model. The non-financial predictors of 
success   and   failure   for   young   firms   in   the 
Netherlands   are   product/service   timing, 
planning,   management   experience   and 
marketing (p<.05), as well as economic timing, 
professional advice and partner (p<.10). 
Practical Implications for Entrepreneurs and 
Public Policy Makers  
This section will highlight the main practical 
implications for entrepreneurs and public policy 
makers.   With   entrepreneurs   potential   and 
existing entrepreneurs are meant. Public policy 
makers are the government and other institutions 
(for example Ministry of Economic Affairs, Tax 
Administration,   Chamber   of   Commerce, 
Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency)  that  are 
involved in the design of public policy. An 
overview   of   the   practical   implications   for 
entrepreneurs   and   public   policy   makers   is 
presented in table 6.
Table 6
Practical Implications for Entrepreneurs and Public Policy Makers
Management 
experience
Entrepreneurs should not be hesitant to start up a new firm, because they lack management 
experience.
Specific planning Planning is important, however the entrepreneur should be aware of the risk of ‘over-
planning’.
Professional advice Entrepreneurs   should   recognize   the   importance   of   different   (non-)   governmental 
institutions that can be a source of support for the firm. 
Product/service 
timing
Entrepreneurs  should be clearly aware in which phase of the product cycle  their 
product/service is. The aim should be to focus on those products and services that are in 
the growth stage.
Economic timing Entrepreneurs should not be hesitant to start their business because of bad macro-
economic prospects.
Partner Entrepreneurs should be aware of the risks that are involved in starting their business with 
one or more business partners. The aim should be to find business partners with 
complementary skills, not with similar skills.




Public policy makers should (continue to) stimulate entrepreneurship also under those 
parties (for example students, low-level employees) that lack management experience.
Specific planning Planning is important, however public policy makers should not overdraw the importance 
of a business plan (for example to require highly detailed business plans in order to start 
up a firm).
Professional advice Public policy makers should (continue to) stimulate organisations that provide support to 
entrepreneurs.
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Product/service 
timing
Public policy makers should provide the information that allowes the entrepreneur to make 
good judgements on the appropriate timing of launching new products and services.
Economic timing Also in times of economic recessions, perhaps even especially, public policy makers 
should (continue to) stimulate entrepreneurship.
Partner Public policy makers should stress the risk of starting a business with one or more 
business partners that do not have complementary, but similar skills.




Every piece of research, including the research 
presented here, suffers from various limitations. 
When one uses the model to assess the chances 
of young firm success and failure, it is important 
to consider that the model is not intended to 
replace  existing  default  risk  techniques.  The 
model   should   be   used   together   with   other 
present techniques used by investors, lenders, 
creditors and other groups to avoid default. This 
model does not provide numerical guidelines for 
distinguishing   success   from   failure.   Careful 
judgement is needed to consign a probability 
(Lussier, 1995). One more general limitation is 
that firms might be successful or fail for other 
reasons than those investigated in this research. 
Another   limitation   relates   to   definition   of 
success; firms had to have made a profit in at 
least one year since start-up and still be in 
operation. This definition might have resulted in 
firms being in the sample of successful firms 
that had made a profit in their first year and then 
made losses in the subsequent years and are still 
in existence. To call such firms true successes 
might be questionable. On the other hand, those 
firms   that   had   never   made   a   profit   were 
excluded from the research. It might very well 
be the case that a firm did not make profits in its 
first years (due to large investments), but will 
make profits in later years and then turns out to 
be a very successful firm. The variables in this 
research were all assessed on the basis of one 
question only: to draw general conclusions on 
the basis of one question only about for example 
the degree to which a firm which started in an 
undercapitalised   state   (variable   capital)   is   a 
limitation. Moreover, a large number of the 
variables   are   the   subjective   self-reported 
perception of business owners. Other limitations 
relate to statistics used. Using logistic regression 
carries   certain   limitations:   outliers   in   the 
solution,   the   ratio   of   cases   to   variables, 
multicollinearity and the adequacy of expected 
frequencies (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). 
Recommendations for Further Research
There are inconsistencies within the literature 
and this study. The majority of the variables 
tested   in   this   research   are   identified   in   the 
literature as factors contributing to firm success 
and firm failure. However, in this research only 
seven of the 21 variables have been found to be 
significant. More research is needed to resolve 
these inconsistencies. Furthermore, the means of 
eight of the 21 variables, as well as the signs of 
four coefficients behaved in a different direction 
than expected for example, failed firms used a 
more   detailed   business   plan.   This   surprising 
outcome   is   also   a   topic   that   needs   to   be 
investigated further. It appeared that the failed 
firms from the sample had more employees than 
the successful firms. It could be that the step up 
from being a small firm to a medium-sized firm 
is a hard one, and that the transition from having 
0-5 employees to 10-20 employees is difficult 
for firms to cope with. The relationship between 
firm   failure   and   growth   (in   the   number   of 
employees) could be an interesting topic for 
further research. Another recommendation is to 
combine quantitative research with qualitative 
research to gain deeper insight into the reasons 
explaining success and failure, and still being 
able to make general remarks on the basis of the 
outcomes. Holding interviews with a selection of 
the successful and failed business owners could 
be one way of achieving this. Another way could 
be to use a case study methodology (appendix 
table 7).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. capital 1
2. rkfc -.318*** 1
3. indus. exp. .024 -.010 1
4. work exp. -.004 .096 .713*** 1
5. mgmt exp. -.202 .406*** .315*** .551*** 1
6. mark. plan .085 -.219** .065 -.100 -.305*** 1
7. fin. plan .048 -.366*** .032 -.080 -.323*** .706*** 1
8. pers.plan -.041 -.245** .027 -.054 -.233*** .674*** .668*** 1
9. prod plan -.054 -.132 .135 .092 -.120 .504*** .503*** .464*** 1
10. r&d plan -.098 -.058 .172 .034 -.131 .492*** .437*** .370*** .511*** 1
11. planning .095 -.262** .052 -.067 -.225** .751*** .777*** .658*** .615***.581*** 1
12. prof. adv. .144 -.402*** .014 -.114 -.278** .460*** .660*** .436*** .388***.370*** .543*** 1
13. yrs. educ. .023 .031 -.096 -.096 .080 .014 .072 .099 .055 -.263** .091 -.135 1
14. staffing -.095 -.029 -.009 -.244** -.258*** .166 .197 .113 -.022 .112 .110 .053-.109 1
15. pr/ser tim .111 -.012 .172 .086 -.078 .110 .123 .027 .057 .233** .157 .082-.189 .072 1
16. ec. time .111 -.065 -.088 -.071 -.195 -.049 -.034 -.018 -.121 .025 -.082 .031-.184 -.031 -.189 1
17. age -.029 .179 .557*** .667*** .582*** -.030 .079 .030 .194 .064 .147 .043 .096 -.210 .073 -.233** 1
18. partner .083 .101 -.008 .076 .088 -.357*** -.331*** -.353*** -.238** -.275** -.243**-.220** .148 -.354*** -.216** -.022 .022 1
19. parents .033 -.006 -.194 -.176 -.107 .009 -.147 .005 -.016 .066 -.069 -.023-.038 .006 .157 .072 -.221** .067 1
20. minority .094 -.032 .078 .050 .054 .168 .053 .024 .050 .154 .130 .155 .040 .024 .046 .043 -.051 .016 -.121 1
21. marketin -.049 .085 .132 .324*** .380*** -.276** -.249** -.194 -.003 -.153 -.293*** -.147 .203 -.286*** -.030 .021 .274** .096 .002.036 1
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Bakker (2004).